Abstract-Traffic measurement is a critical function in transportation engineering. We consider privacy-preserving point-topoint traffic measurement in this paper. We measure the number of vehicles traveling from one geographical location to another by taking advantage of capabilities provided by the intelligent cyberphysical road systems (CPRSs) that enable automatic collection of traffic data. The challenge is to allow the collection of aggregate point-to-point data while preserving the privacy of individual vehicles. We propose a novel measurement scheme, which utilizes bit arrays to collect "masked" data and adopts maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to obtain the measurement result. Both mathematical proof and simulation demonstrate the practicality and scalability of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
N EW technologies in vehicular communications and networking [1] - [6] have greatly advanced the design of intelligent cyber-physical road systems (CPRSs). To fully realize the potential of such systems and improve the capacity of existing infrastructures, traffic measurement is a critical function in transportation engineering [7] . There are two categories of traffic statistics, i.e., "point" statistics and "point-topoint" statistics. Point statistics describe the number of vehicles traversing a specific point (location). Various prediction models have been proposed to estimate them [8] - [11] . Point-to-point statistics describe the number of vehicles traveling between two points (locations). They are essential inputs to a variety of studies, including estimation of traffic link flow distribution as part of investment plan and calculation of road exposure rates as part of safety analysis, etc. Although some point-to-point statistics may be inferred from point data [12] , the practicality is limited by either high computation overhead or degraded measurement accuracy. As for direct measurement of "pointto-point" traffic, little work has been done particularly when drivers' location privacy is concerned.
This paper considers the important problem of privacypreserving point-to-point transportation traffic measurement. The set of vehicles traveling from one geographical location to another is modeled as a traffic flow, and the flow size is the number of vehicles in the set. To enable automatic collection of traffic flow data, we take advantage of intelligent CPRSs, which integrate the latest technologies in wireless communications and on-board computer processing into transportation systems [13] , [14] . In particular, IntelliDrive [15] from the U.S. Department of Transportation [16] envisions a nationwide system where vehicles communicate with roadside equipments (RSEs) in real time via dedicated short-range communications (DSRC). In CPRSs, vehicles may report their IDs to RSEs when they pass by, and this information can be used by the authority to measure traffic flows. However, if a vehicle keeps transmitting its unique identifier to RSEs, the information will enable others to track its entire moving history. As increasingly more people are concerned about their location privacy, the degree of privacy that a traffic measurement scheme preserves will directly affect its applicability.
To address the concerns of privacy, there are many issues that we need to consider. First of all, we need a criterion to tell what is good privacy and what is not. In this paper, we capture the essence of privacy in traffic flow measurement and quantify it as a probability that a potential tracker cannot identify any trace of any vehicle. Second, given this criterion, how can we preserve the optimal privacy? Apparently, the better the privacy, the more applicable the measurement scheme. Furthermore, to protect the privacy of vehicles, only randomized and deidentified information is collected. How can we achieve sound measurement accuracy based on information that looks totally random?
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for privacypreserving traffic flow measurement. It utilizes bit arrays to encode "masked" data sent from vehicles to RSEs and adopts maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to obtain measurement results. The measurement accuracy and preserved privacy are analyzed through both mathematical proof and simulations, which demonstrate the applicability of our scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the preliminaries. Section III presents our scheme and its analysis. Section IV shows simulation results. Section V summarizes related work. Section VI draws the conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. System Model
We consider an intelligent CPRS model, as shown in Fig. 1 , which involves three types of entities, namely, vehicles, RSEs, and a central server. Each vehicle has a unique ID, i.e., its vehicle identification number. Each RSE also has its unique ID. Both vehicles and RSEs are equipped with computing and communication capabilities, e.g., on-board computer chips and communication modules. Vehicles communicate with RSEs in real time via DSRC [16] . RSEs are connected to the central server through wired or wireless means. They collect information from vehicles and transfer it to the central server on a periodical basis.
B. Problem Statement
We define a traffic flow between one RSE-equipped location and another RSE-equipped location as the set of vehicles traveling between the two locations during a measurement period. The size of the traffic flow is the number of vehicles in this set. Our problem is to measure the sizes of traffic flows in a road system between all pairs of locations where RSEs are installed while protecting vehicles' privacy. To achieve the privacy-preserving end, we need a solution in which a vehicle never transmits any fixed identifier. Ideally, the information transmitted by the vehicles to the RSEs looks totally random, out of which neither the identity nor the trajectory of any vehicle can be pried with high probability.
We also assume that a special medium access control (MAC) protocol is applied to support privacy preservation such that the MAC address of a vehicle is not fixed. Vehicles may pick a MAC address randomly from a large space for one-time use when needed.
C. Threat Model
We assume a semi-honest model for the RSEs. On the one hand, all RSEs are from trustworthy authorities, which can be enforced by authentication based on PKI. The vehicles can use the public key certificate broadcasted by RSEs, which they obtained from trusted third parties, to verify the RSEs. On the other hand, the authorities may exploit the information collected by RSEs to track individual vehicles when they need to do so. For instance, if a vehicle transmits any fixed identifier upon each query, that identifier can be used for tracking purposes.
Note that there are other ways to track a vehicle, for example, tailgating the vehicle or setting cameras near RSEs to take photos and using image processing to recognize it. These methods are beyond the scope of this paper. In this paper, we focus on preventing automatical tracking caused by the traffic flow measurement scheme itself.
D. Performance Metrics
In this paper, we consider three performance metrics to evaluate a traffic flow measurement scheme, namely, measurement accuracy, computation overhead, and preserved privacy. They are defined in the following.
1) Measurement Accuracy:
Let n c be the real size of a traffic flow between a pair of locations andn c be the corresponding measurement result. We specify the measurement accuracy through a parameter β such that the probability for n c to fall into the interval [n c · (1 − β),n c · (1 + β)] must be at least α, where α is a predetermined parameter in the range of [0, 1]. For a given probability α, a smaller value of β means better measurement results. For example, when α = 95%, a solution with β = 0.05 is more accurate than a solution with β = 0.1 because the former ensures that the measured traffic flow size has a probability of 95% to be within ±5% deviation from the real value, whereas the latter only ensures the measured result to be within ±10% deviation from the real value under the same probability.
2) Computation Overhead: We consider the computation overhead for vehicles, RSEs, and the central server. For vehicles, we measure the computation overhead for each vehicle per RSE en route. For RSEs, we measure the computation overhead for each RSE per passing vehicle. For the central server, we measure the computation overhead for it to measure the traffic flow size for a pair of RSEs.
3) Preserved Privacy: We capture the essence of privacy preservation in point-to-point transportation traffic measurement, which is allowing the tracker only a limited chance of identifying partially or fully any trajectory of any vehicle. Accordingly, we quantify the privacy of a scheme through a parameter p, which satisfies the following requirement: The probability for any "trace" of any vehicle to not be identified must be at least p, where a trace of a vehicle is a pair of RSEs it has passed by. A larger value of p means better privacy. Intuitively, a scheme with p = 0.9 is better than a scheme with p = 0.5 in terms of privacy because the latter gives the tracker a better chance to link traces of a vehicle to obtain its trajectory since it allows the traces to be identified with a higher probability, i.e., 1 − p.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING POINT-TO-POINT TRANSPORTATION TRAFFIC MEASUREMENT
Here, we present our novel scheme for privacy-preserving point-to-point transportation traffic measurement. There are two phases for each measurement period, namely, online coding and offline decoding. Online coding is an interaction between vehicles and RSEs to securely collect information for traffic flow measurement. Later in the offline decoding phase, the central server will use this information to compute traffic flow sizes. We first show the two measurement phases, and then evaluate our scheme with respect to the three performance metrics described in Section II-D.
A. Online Coding Phase
As presented in our previous work [17] , in our scheme, each RSE R x maintains a counter n x , which keeps track of the total number of vehicles passing by during the current measurement period. R x also maintains a bit array B x with a fixed length m to mask vehicle identities. At the beginning of each measurement period, n x and all the bits in B x are set to zeros. In addition, each vehicle v has a logical bit array LB v , which consists of s (1 < s < m) bits randomly selected from B x . The indices of these bits in
where ⊕ is the bitwise XOR, H(. . . ) is a hash function whose range is [0, m), X is an integer array of randomly chosen constants whose purpose is to arbitrarily alter the hash result, and K v is the private key of v to protect the privacy of its logical bit array.
The online coding phase is quite simple. RSEs broadcast queries in preset intervals (e.g., once a second), ensuring that each passing vehicle receives at least one query and meanwhile giving enough time for the vehicle to reply. Collisions can be resolved through well-established carrier sense multiple-access or time-division multiple-access protocols, which are not the focus of this paper. Every query that an RSE sends out includes the RSE's registered application provider identifier (RID) and its public key certificate. Suppose that a vehicle, whose ID is v, receives a query from an RSE, whose ID is R x . The vehicle first verifies the certificate and then uses the RSE's public key to authenticate the RSE. After verifying that R x is from a trustworthy authority, the vehicle v randomly selects a bit from its logical bit array LB v by computing an index
The vehicle v then sends the resulting index b to the RSE R x . Upon receiving the index b, R x will first increase its counter n x by 1 and then set the bth bit in B x to 1
Note that the same vehicle may transmit different bit indices at two RSEs. The probability for this to happen is 1 − (1/s), which is larger when the size of LB v is larger. Different vehicles may send the same index because their logical bit arrays share bits from B x . As any vehicle does not have to transmit any fixed number, we improve privacy protection. This is true even when there is a single vehicle passing through two RSEs.
B. Offline Decoding Phase
At the end of each measurement period, all RSEs will send their counters and bit arrays to the central server, which then performs the offline measurement. We employ the MLE [18] to measure the sizes of traffic flows based on the counters and bit arrays.
Suppose that the set of vehicles that pass RSE R x (R y ) is denoted as S x (S y ) with cardinality |S x | = n x (|S y | = n y ). Clearly, the set of vehicles that pass both RSEs R x and R y is S x ∩ S y . Denote its cardinality as n c , which is the value that we want to measure. Furthermore, denote by S the subset of vehicles in S x ∩ S y that happen to set the same bit in B x and B y , where B x and B y are the bit arrays at R x and R y , respectively. Let n o be the cardinality of S, i.e., n o = |S|. Clearly, S ⊆ S x ∩ S y and 0 ≤ n o ≤ n c . For any vehicle, it has the same probability 1/s to set any bit in its s-bit logical bit array. As a result, the probability for an arbitrary vehicle v from S x ∩ S y to select the same bit in both B x and B y is s × (1/s) × (1/s) = 1/s. Therefore, the number of such vehicles n o is binomially distributed according to B(n c , 1/s). Accordingly, the probability for
Given the counters n x and n y and bit arrays B x and B y , we measure n c as follows: First, take a bitwise AND of B x and B y and denote the resulting bit array as B c . Namely
We can easily find out the number of 0's in B c , denoted by U c . In the following, we will analyze the probability for an arbitrary bit in B c to remain "0" after the online coding phase and use it to establish the likelihood function for us to observe U c "0" bits in B c . Maximizing the likelihood function with respect to n c will give the MLE estimate of n c .
Clearly, the event for an arbitrary bit b in B c to remain "0" after online coding is equivalent to the combination of the following two events.
1) Event 1: None of the vehicles in S has chosen b at
and B y are both set to "1" by v (hence, bit b in B c is also "1"). Since each vehicle has probability 1/m to set bit b to "1", the probability for the vehicle not to choose bit b is 1 − (1/m). There are n o vehicles in S. Therefore, the probability for the first event to happen is the following:
2) Event 2: Either none of the vehicles in S x − S has chosen b at R x or none of the vehicles in S y − S has chosen b at R y . Otherwise, bit b in both B x and B y will be "1" (hence, bit b in B c is "1"). The probability for bit b not chosen by any vehicle in
and the probability for bit b not chosen by any vehicle in S y − S is (1 − (1/m)) n y −n o . Therefore, the probability for the second event to happen is
Combining this analysis, the conditional probability for bit
Given q(n c |n o = z) and the distribution of n o , the overall probability q(n c ) for an arbitrary bit b in B c to remain "0" is
where C is a value determined by s and m only
Knowing that each bit in B c has a probability q(n c ) to remain "0", we can establish the likelihood function for us to observe
The MLE estimate of n c is the optimal value of n c that maximizes the likelihood function in (9)
To findn c , we take a logarithm on both sides of (9)
Take the first-order derivative of (11), we have
where q (n c ) can be computed from (7) as follows:
To computen c , we set the right side of (12) to 0
Observe from (13) that q (n c ) cannot be 0 when m > 1 and s > 1. Therefore, we have
Substituting (7) into (15), we obtain the MLE estimatorn c of the desired traffic flow size n c as follows:
C. Measurement Accuracy
In the subsequent sections, we discuss the performance of our scheme with respect to the three performance metrics described in Section II-D. We start with analyzing the measurement accuracy. The standard theory of MLE [19] says that when m, n x , and n y are large enough, the MLE estimatorn c approximately follows the normal distribution
where I(n c ) is the Fisher information on L, which is defined as
We compute the second-order derivative of ln L from (12)
where C is given in (8) , and q (n c ) is given in (13) .
For an arbitrary bit b in B c , it has the probability q(n c ) to remain "0". U c is the number of "0"s in B c . Therefore, U c follows a binomial distribution B (m, q(n c )) . Accordingly
Substituting (19) and (20) to compute (18), we have
According to (17) , the variance ofn c is
Therefore, the confidence interval of our measurement iŝ
where α is the confidence level, and Z α is the α percentile for the standard Gaussian distribution [20] . For example, when α = 95%, Z α = 1.6.
D. Preserved Privacy
Next, we evaluate the preserved privacy of our measurement scheme. Note that, in our scheme, the only information that a vehicle v ever transmits to an RSE en route is an index of a bit b randomly selected from its s-bit logical bit array LB v . From the tracker's point of view, it can only identify the trace of a vehicle passing by two RSEs R x and R y through the observation of the bits that are set to "1" in both B x and B y ; these bits will be "1" in B c . Therefore, the preserved privacy of our scheme is actually a conditional probability, which tells to what degree an observed "1" in B c does not represent a common vehicle passing by both R x and R y . We derive this conditional probability in the following.
First, consider the probability for the tracker to observe an arbitrary bit b to be set to "1" in both its B x and B y (event A), i.e., P (A). Obviously, the probability P (A) is equal to 1 minus q(n c ) given our analysis in Section III-B
where C is given in (8) . Second, consider the conditional probability for such a bit b to not represent a common vehicle passing both R x and R y (event E), i.e., P (E|A). This is the privacy p that we want to derive. Note that event E happens if and only if bit b in B x is set only by vehicles passing only RSE R x (i.e., in set S x − S y ) and bit b in B y is set only by vehicles passing only RSE R y (i.e., in set S y − S x ). Denote these two events as E x and E y , respectively. There are n x (n y ) vehicles passing R x (R y ), and n c vehicles among them pass both R x and R y . Since each vehicle has a probability 1/m to set bit b to "1," the probability for E x (E y ) to happen is
Combining this analysis, we have the formula for the preserved privacy of our scheme, i.e.,
where P (A) is given in (24) .
Observe that there are two parameters, i.e., s and m, that determine the value of P (E|A). Among them, s only appears in the denominator P (A), and it influences P (E|A) through varying the value of P (A). m influences both the denominator and the numerator. In the following, we first examine the influence of s on P (A) (hence, on P (E|A)) and then analyze how m affects the value of P (E|A).
1) Influence of s on P (A):
To examine how s affects P (A), we take partial derivative of (24) with respect to s ∂P (A) ∂s
where C is given in (8) . Clearly, (∂P (A)/∂s) < 0. Therefore, with the increment of s, the value of P (A) decreases, and in turn, the value of P (E|A) increases. In other words, privacy will be better with a larger value of s. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 2 where n x = n y = n = 50 000; n c = 5000; and s = 2, 5, and 10, corresponding to three curves in each plot. Clearly, as s increases, the probability P (A) decreases.
Another observation from the numerical results is that, when s > 5, the difference in probability P (A) under different s becomes quite small. For instance, with m ∈ [5n, 20n], the difference in P (A) when s = 5 and s = 10 is smaller than 0.0005 (see the two lower curves in the right plot in Fig. 2 ). When n > 10, this difference becomes negligible. Therefore, when we analyze the effect of m on P (E|A) in the following section and later when we set up the parameters for our simulations, we will only consider the cases of s = 2, 5, and 10, with an established understanding that larger values of s will only make negligible difference.
2) Influence of m on P (E|A): To examine the effect of m on P (E|A), we take the partial derivative of (27) with respect to m and obtain the following:
where P (E) = P (E x ) × P (E y ). P (E x ) and P (E y ) are given in (25) and (26), respectively. Therefore, the partial derivative of P (E) with respect to m is
In addition, from (24), we can compute the derivative of P (A) with respect to m
We have proved that (∂P (A)/∂m) < 0, which means that P (A) will decrease with the increment of m. In addition, (∂P (E)/∂m) will be also negative when m exceeds a certain value, which means that P (E) will also decrease with the increment of m afterward. Intuitively, increasing m gives each vehicle a smaller chance 1/m to set an arbitrary bit b. Hence, P (E) and P (A) also drop. The effect that m has on P (E|A) is twofold: On one hand, the increment of m decreases the denominator P (A), which improves the privacy; on the other hand, the increment of m decreases the numerator P (E), which reduces the privacy. With the combination of the two effects, the partial derivative of P (E|A) with respect to m can be positive, negative, or 0, according to (29). Therefore, given a value of s, we can choose an optimal m to achieve the best privacy. The optimal m is obtained by setting the right side of (29) to 0. Fig. 3 shows the numerical results for the probability P (E) and the preserved privacy p = P (E|A) under different m when n x = n y = n = 50 000; n c = 5000; and s = 2, 5, and 10. From the left plot, one can see that the three different values of s yield the same curve of P (E) (or the three curves of P (E) corresponding to s = 2, 5, and 10 overlap completely). In other words, the value of s is irrelevant to the probability P (E), which is consistent with our previous analysis. The value of m, on the other hand, has a clear impact on the value of P (E). Specifically, there exists an optimal point where m * produces a maximum value of P (E). When m < m * , the value of P (E) dramatically increases with the increment of m. When m > m * , the value of P (E) decreases with a slower and slower pace. In the figure, m * = 0.39n results in an optimal value of P (E) = 0.4856. Recall from Fig. 2 that the value of P (A) always decreases with the increment of m. Combining these results, we learn that, as m exceeds a certain value m * , probabilities P (E) and P (A) will both drop if we further increase m, which is also consistent to our theoretic analysis.
Finally, the right plot in Fig. 3 gives the combined effect of s and m on P (E|A), the privacy of our scheme. The smallest value of s = 2 yields the bottom curve that represents the least privacy, whereas the largest value of s = 10 yields the top curve that represents the best privacy, which agrees with our previous analysis that a larger value of s brings better privacy. Clearly, in each curve, P (E|A) first quickly increases and then slowly decreases with respect to m. There is an optimal value of m that gives the optimal privacy. For instance, m = 3.6n gives the optimal privacy 0.7661 when s = 10. Another observation is that, when s is large (5 or 10), there always exists a smooth interval of m near its optimal point that can achieve nearoptimal privacy. For example, when s = 10, the values of m in the interval [3.6n, 11.2n] achieve privacy that is within 5% drop of the optimal privacy 0.7661. In practice, this smooth interval allows us to adjust the value of m to achieve better measurement results while preserving near-optimal privacy.
E. Computation Overhead
We conclude the discussion about the performance of our measurement scheme by a quick remark on the computation overhead incurred to each group of entities involved in the system. In our scheme, when a vehicle v passes an RSE R x , the vehicle v only needs to compute two hashes to obtain an index of a random bit in its logical bit array LB v , and the RSE R x only needs to set one bit in its bit array B x , as described in Section III-A. Therefore, the computation overhead for each vehicle per RSE and that for each RSE per vehicle are both O (1) . As for the central server, to compute the traffic flow size between a pair of locations, it only needs to perform a bitwise AND operation over two m-bit arrays, count the number of "0"s in the resulting bit array, and use formula (16) to compute the MLE estimator. Therefore, the computation overhead for the central server is O(m). 
IV. SIMULATION
Here, we evaluate the performance of our scheme through simulations. The simulation platform is a PC featured with an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU and 8-GB RAM. The simulations are performed under five system parameters, i.e., n x , n y , n c , s, and m. For a pair of RSEs, R x and R y , n x (n y ) is the number of vehicles passing by R x (R y ). There are n c vehicles passing both R x and R y , which means that the real traffic flow size is n c . s is the number of bits in each vehicle's logical bit array, and m is the number of bits in each RSE's bit array. Our simulations consist of two parts. For each part, we first describe the settings of the system parameters and then report the simulation results and the analysis.
A. Measured Traffic Flown c
We first measure traffic flows and observe how different parameters influence the gap between the measured flow sizes and the real sizes when the optimal privacy is preserved. We choose the five parameters as follows: n x = n y = n = 50 000, 100 000, or 500 000, and n c varies from 1%n to 50%n, with a step size of 0.1%n; s = 2, 5, and 10, and m is chosen to achieve the optimal privacy, as determined in Section III-D. Table I lists the values of the bit array size m to achieve the optimal privacy p under different values of s.
Figs. 4-6 show our simulation results when n = 50 000, 100 000, and 500 000, respectively. For each figure, there are three plots, corresponding to the results of three sets of simulations controlled by parameter s, where s = 2, 5, and 10. Each plot shows the measured traffic flow sizesn c (y-axis) with respect to different real traffic flow sizes n c (x-axis) under a given setting of n, s, and m, where m is chosen as described in Table I so that the optimal privacy is achieved. We also draw the equality line y = x in each plot for reference. Clearly, the closer a point is to the equality line, the more accurate the measurement result.
From the three figures, one can see that our scheme is quite accurate because most of the points in all plots of the three figures lie closely to the equality line. In particular, given other parameters, our scheme produces almost perfect results when s = 2 (see the first plot in Figs. 4-6) . When s becomes larger, there are slightly more points deviating from the equality line (see the third plot in Figs. 4-6 ), which indicates that larger values of s yield less accurate measurement results.
Recall that a larger value of s brings better privacy (see Table I ). For example, the optimal privacy is 0.7661 when s = 10, better than the optimal privacy of 0.7258 when s = 2. This implies a tradeoff between the privacy and the accuracy. From Section III-D, we know when s is large, there always exists a smooth interval of m near its extreme point that can achieve comparable privacy as the optimal. For example, when n x = n y = n = 50 000, n c = 5000, and s = 10, the values of m within the interval [3.6n, 11.2n] achieve privacy that is within just 5% drop of the optimal privacy 0.7661. In reality, one can choose a relatively large value for s (e.g., 5 or 10) and adjust the value of m to achieve better measurement results while still preserving comparable privacy as the optimal.
Finally, the measurement results are more accurate with larger values of n. There are fewer points deviating from the equality linen c = n c in the three plots in Fig. 6 than those in Fig. 4 . This is also a natural phenomenon given that the result is measured through a statistical MLE estimator.
B. Measurement Bias and Relative Standard Error
Next, we study the measurement accuracy of the MLE estimatorn c in terms of bias and relative standard error. Similar to the previous part, there are three sets of simulations, corresponding to n x = n y = n = 50 000, 100 000, and 500 000. For each set, there are three simulations controlled by different values of s, where s = 2, 5, and 10. m is still chosen to achieve the optimal privacy p under each fixed s, as listed in Table I . We conduct 5000 independent runs for each simulation to observe statistical effects. For each run, we randomly choose a value for n c from the range of [0, 0.5n] and apply our scheme to obtain the corresponding value forn c . Now, we try to figure out the measurement bias E(n c − n c ) and relative standard error V ar(n c )/n c of our MLE estimator from the result of the 5000 independent runs of each simulation.
To better illustrate the simulation results, we divide the range of n c , [0, 0.5n], into 50 measurement scales, each of width 1%n; group the values of n c and correspondingn c from different runs into these 50 scales; and then numerically evaluate the measurement bias and relative standard error of n c with respect to each scale of n c . The simulation results are presented in Figs. 7-12 , where the first three figures (see show the measurement bias and the remaining three figures (see show the relative standard error.
Figs. 7-9 show the measurement bias ofn c with respect to each scale of n c under different values of n, where n = 50 000, 100 000, and 500 000. Each figure consists of three plots, each corresponding to a fixed value of s, where s = 2, 5, and 10. For each plot, the y-axis represents the measurement bias E(n c − n c ), and the x-axis represents the mean value of n c in each scale. The y-coordinate is within 2.5% of n, i.e., ranging from −2.5%n to 2.5%n. Note that the optimal privacy is always guaranteed for all simulations by setting m in accordance with s. In the figures, one can see that the measurement bias fluctuates around the zero-bias line for different scales of n c . In addition, as observed from the three plots of each figure, under a fixed n, the measurement bias tends to fluctuate more often with higher amplitudes for larger values of s (e.g., compare the first plot in Figs. 7-9 with the third plot of the same figures), which implies that larger values of s will result in moren c deviating from n c and, in turn, yield less accurate measurement results. This observation agrees with our simulation results from the previous part. Furthermore, if we compare the plots from different figures (e.g., first plot of each figure) , it is clear that, under the same value of s, increasing the value of n will reduce the fluctuation amplitudes ofn c , which means that our scheme will produce more stable and accurate measurement results for larger scale systems.
Figs. 10-12 show the relative standard error ofn c with respect to each scale of n c under different values of n, where n = 50 000, 100 000, and 500 000. There are also three plots in each figure, each corresponding to a fixed value of s, where s = 2, 5, and 10. For each plot, the y-axis represents the relative standard error ofn c , V ar(n c )/n c , and the x-axis represents the mean value of n c in each scale. Still, optimal privacy is guaranteed through setting appropriate m. The major observation is that, given n, when s becomes larger, the relative standard error ofn c with respect to each scale of n c also becomes larger. For instance, when n = 50 000, the relative standard error ofn c is about 0.017 for the scale of n c ranging from [8500, 9000] when s = 2, whereas its value reaches to about 0.13 when s = 10, almost eight times higher than the former value. Since the relative standard error for each scale of n c becomes larger, the variance ofn c also becomes larger, which means that the measured traffic flow sizes will be more spread out from the real flow sizes. This observation also agrees with our previous simulation results, where there are relatively more points not close to the equality line for larger values of s under fixed n. Similarly, the variance becomes smaller when we increase the number n of vehicles. One can see that the relative standard errors are closer to 0 in Fig. 12 than those in Fig. 10 , assuming that the same value of s is applied.
V. RELATED WORK
A. Transportation Traffic Measurement
In the area of transportation traffic measurement, various prediction models have been proposed to measure "point" traffic statistics using data recorded by automatic traffic recorders installed at road sections, for example, the multiple linear regression model in [8] , artificial neural network in [9] , spatial statistical method in [10] , and support vector regression in [11] . These solutions, although elegant, are not appropriate for "point-to-point" transportation traffic measurement. As stated in the introduction, "point-to-point" traffic measurement is also critical in traffic engineering. However, few research efforts exist in literature that focus on this problem while preserving the location privacy of individual vehicles in the meantime. The recent work in [12] tries to infer "point-to-point" statistics from "point" data, but the high computation overhead limits its practicability. Our previous work [21] utilizes an encryption method to preserve vehicles' location privacy and measures point-to-point traffic based on the encrypted vehicle IDs. The computation efficiency is improved to O(n x n y ) for each pair of RSEs, where n x and n y denote the number of vehicles passing them, respectively. This overhead is still too high for today's large-scale road networks. Although Google recently announced to provide real-time traffic data service in Google Maps [22] , their approach cannot assure vehicle's privacy since it uses GPS and Wi-Fi in phones to track locations [23] .
B. Network Traffic Measurement
Another branch of research that relates to (but is also significantly different from) ours is network traffic measurement, where researchers have proposed various methods for traffic flow measurement in the network environment, i.e., to measure the network traffic between two network routers. The solutions can be summarized into two categories. One is indirect estimation based on link load and network routing by employing statistical techniques [24] , [25] . These methods cannot achieve high accuracy since their estimations are based on unknown traffic volume. The other is direct measurement by different counting methods [26] , [27] . In particular, in [27] , a bitmapbased counting method was developed for traffic flow measurement, which is most related to our work. However, all these solutions are not appropriate for our problem because they measure traffic in the network environment where the privacy of packets is not a concern, and counting can be done directly based on the packet IDs. In our problem, the privacy of vehicles is the major concern. Therefore, the solutions must incorporate randomization and de-identification techniques to protect vehicles' privacy and do counting based on information that looks totally random.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on privacy-preserving "pointto-point" transportation traffic monitoring in intelligent CPRSs. We formalize "point-to-point" traffic as traffic flows and quantify privacy as a probability. We propose a novel scheme that allows the collection of aggregate traffic flow data while preserving the privacy of individual vehicles. The proposed scheme utilizes bit arrays to collect "masked" data and adopts MLE to obtain the measurement result. Its feasibility and scalability are shown by mathematical proofs and simulations.
